The Silver Tsunami or population ageing has become a globally widespread phenomenon. The purpose of this review is to observe its dynamics and consequences from a local Balkan perspective. The main drivers of this unique demographic evolution are extended longevity, improved early childhood survival, absorption of women into the labor markets, and consequences of sexual revolution leading to falling female fertility. This process lasting well over a century is taking its toll on contemporary societies. Major side effects are shrinking young labor force and growing pool of elderly and retired citizens in many countries. This equation tends to worsen further in the future threatening long-term financial sustainability of public social and health insurance funds. Notable health expenditure growth, accelerating worldwide since the 1960s, is to a large degree attributable to ageing itself. Growing share of senior citizens increases demand for medical services and costs of health care provision. Home-based care provided by the family caregivers presents another important reality putting a huge burden on modern communities. Serbs are no exception in this landscape. Historical demographic evolution of this nation gives a clear evidence of advanced and accelerated ageing, which is well documented in post-World War II era. This synthesis of rich published evidence shows clear upward parallel trend between the pace of population aging and the growth of health expenditure. National authorities shall be forced to consider reform of the current health care financing pattern inherited from the demographic growth era. This might be the only way to smooth out the impact of population ageing on the financial sustainability of the health system and long-term medical care in Serbia.
INTRODUCTION
Population ageing or the so-called "Silver Tsunami" presents a unique phenomenon in written demographic history of the mankind over the past eight millennia [1] . Traditional societies, regardless of the dominant ethno-religious pattern or the way of life, were young societies [2] . These were dominated by at least 15% of children younger than five years and with the portion of elderly aged over 65 significantly less than 5%. In contemporary momentum, as we approach year 2020, the growing portion of senior citizens and the decreasing portion of children are meeting a melting point, where these two trend lines are about to cross each other for the first time ever [3] . How did it all happen?
The social circumstances changed essentially since the dawn of European Industrial Revolution [4] . Although some of these nations, such as the French one, entered the aging process almost two centuries ago, this hadn't become a noticeable social and public-health issue almost until the 1980s [5] . The fall of female fertility was caused by the sexual revolution, female education, and the absorption of women into the labor markets worldwide [6, 7, 8] . These changes created effective financial incentives for women to give birth to fewer children. The second side of the equation were successes of modern medicine. Early childhood survival became far more successful and human longevity gains were bold [9] . Combined effects of extended life expectancy of an average citizen at birth coupled with lower fertility effectively created the conditions for the increase of median age within the society [10] .
Once upon a time, poor agricultural nations on European soil had a median population age far below the age of 20. This landscape resembles very few remaining contemporary countries, such as Afghanistan or the states of Sudanese Africa. These countries are marked by the United Nations Population and Social Affairs Division as eighteen "demographic outliers." Unlike these, vast majority of nations around the world, led by the earliest historical shift across industrialized Northern Hemisphere, belong to the dominant ageing pattern [11] . Nowadays, their median population age is either approaching 40 years or even slightly crossing this threshold.
RESHAPING THE POPULATION PYRAMID OF MODERN-DAY NATIONS
Important part of the aforementioned farreaching changes is not only moving upward the median population age bur rather reshap-ing the entire population pyramid. Once dominated by the youth and children, today we face gradual but unidirectional spreading of community share of senior citizens. Although it affects both sexes, due to natural higher longevity of women in most cultures, there is an effect called "feminization" of the senior population. This refers to the domination of women among the elderly. Besides this, it is possible to observe not only the growing percentage of persons aged 60/65 or more, but also the growing portion of persons in deep senium -older than 80. Actually, while observing the landscape of changes, we see crystal clear evidence supporting the accelerated population ageing across the globe [12] . This means that the percentage point share of the elderly has grown far more quickly during the past three decades as compared to the previous three decades.
Some regions of the world entered this demographic transition earlier than others and today find themselves in a more advanced stage of ageing. Europe and Asia are typical examples, each one in its own peculiar conditions. So far, Europe remains the oldest continent, but as we approach 2050, regardless of the recent one-child policy shifts, it is obvious that China will become the fastest ageing large nation [13, 14] . A recent research on top ranked emerging markets led by the BRICS and the Next Eleven nations gives a hint on how this phenomenon is spreading from the traditional high-income countries towards the so-called newly-industrialized economies [15] . In geographic terms, it usually means migration of decreasing fertility pattern from the rich North towards the rising nations of the global South. Notable exception in this group of countries is the Russian Federation with its early historical roots of ageing in the late imperial Romanov era and its exceptional industrial legacy of the former Soviet Union [16] . Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 and accelerated globalization in many world regions such as the Eastern Europe, there is direct evidence of accelerated population ageing in these new social circumstances [17] .
THE IMPACT OF AGEING ON MEDICAL SPENDING
How does population ageing affect the demand for medical services and work load for national health systems worldwide? There are several sides to this equation [18] .
Firstly, there is the fact of simple labor market shrinking and the serious issue of long-term financial sustainability of national health systems [19] . Since the late 19th century Bismarck-style initiatives, European tradition has introduced modern risk-sharing arrangements and the very concept of health insurance [20] . The target groups during these early decades were industrial workers and their families. The concept gradually became applied to most layers of societies throughout the long course of history [21] . Surprisingly for many scholars, the first nation to deliver universal health coverage for the entire nation inclusive of the poor was the Soviet Union as early as back in early 1930s with its renowned Semashko system [22] . The standard way of funding massive and hierarchical modern-day health systems was imposing broad revenue base for the health insurance funds burdened on the shoulders of employees and employers alike [23] . Be it this or the general taxation model, a variety of different patterns of health care funding in most contemporary societies rely on a massive body of employed citizens. These people at their best working life age are effectively supporting the needs of elderly and retired citizens [24] . Most of these financial strategies were historically derived many decades ago, from the so-called population growth mode. They have one important assumption: that lower younger floors of the demographic building supporting the heavy upper floors consisting of senior citizens will always prevail in numbers and strength. Unfortunately, our time witnesses putting this axiom to the limit. Lower floors are becoming ever thinner and weaker and upper floors are becoming more massive. The work force is shrinking while the pool of retired citizens receiving and consuming all kinds of social benefits is expanding [25] .
The second fact refers to testified medical needs of the elderly. Searching through the scholarly literature we find an abundance of evidence that senior patients tend to suffer from expensive chronic non-communicable diseases. They do more frequent laboratory tests and imaging examinations, have more outpatient physician visits, frequent and lengthier hospital admissions, and consume more prescription and over the counter medicines [26] . Furthermore, their need for occasional medical implants, physiotherapy treatments, and psychotherapy is far more exposed compared to younger counterparts. The crown on the medical spending attributable to the age group of 60 and above is probably the last year of life. It is well documented that the last year palliative and/or terminal care, particularly the one referring to cancer, usually costs as much as that individual's entire lifetime medical consumption [27] .
The third contributing cost driver lies outside the entire hospital sector and is frequently heavily underestimated. It refers to the home-based care for the elderly, exhausted, and sick persons [28] . Only a minor part of this care is provided for by professional facilities and nursing staffs. To a large extent, this burden relies on family caregivers. The social costs of such an engagement are hidden, and visible ones present only the tip of the iceberg [29] . Examples from Israel and Japan witness the massive pool of people in the community working hard at full-time jobs, with all further ramifications for their families and their workplace [30, 31] . Among many related ongoing developments, the exploding pandemic of dementia worldwide will probably make this burden far heavier in the foreseeable future, with Asia and Europe in the lead.
An essential part of the global transformation of health expenditures among the regions with entirely different economic models is the fact that low-and middle-income countries are overtaking an increasingly growing share of the World's total health spending [32] . This fact becomes most obvious when we compare the leading among the traditional free-market high-income economies such as G7 and the leading emerging markets such as the BRICS [33] . In a three-decade time horizon it is clear that partici-pation of the latter led by China is getting bigger at the expense of the former group of countries led by the US [34] .
AGEING AMONG SERBS
Serbs as one of the traditional nations of Europe since antiquity began to age almost a century ago [35] . Prior to World War I, there had been the 1870-1910 time window testifying of exceptionally high birth rates and top-ranked fertility in most of Europe. Since those days, fertility has been falling faster or slower, depending on historical circumstances and overall social welfare [36] . Most authors recognize constant negative migration rates as a contributing factor to the ageing process [37] . Nevertheless, decreasing fertility rates and extended longevity remain as the major drivers [38] . Life expectancy at birth was growing in Serbia as in most other similar Eastern European countries significantly in the decades immediately following World War II. These successes were partly attributable to the established methods of preventive and clinical medicine, but probably far more to the improved welfare and living standards. Upward trend characteristic of the socialist era of peaceful prosperity in the former Yugoslavia ended with civil wars of 1990s [39] . Consecutively, in these years, there was a peak of total population size in Serbia, which continued to shrink further in the upcoming years marked with poverty. Partial economic recovery since the early 2000s shaken by the global recession reaching Serbia only in 2010/2011 had some visible impact on fertility rates. In the meantime, government population policies proposed some measures of support to the childbearing families. Heavy emphasis was on the third-child policy, whose implementation was poor and heavily dependent on frequent government mainstream priority changes in the country. Regardless of some temporary successes, the downward trend remains persistent in the long run in all major demographic trends [40] .
Official UN Population and Social Affairs registries provide data on ageing indicators for most countries for the 1950-2015 period and a medium scenario forecasts up to year 2100. It is tempting to observe some of these data in comparison with the data on health spending in Serbia. Unlike demography, it was only since establishing the National Health Accounts System in 1995 that financial flows within the national health systems became measurable in an internationally comparable manner. Therefore, we can consider some of these data in Table 1 presented below. Both sets of population and economics variables refer to the Republic of Serbia within the 1995-2015 time window or the closest years available. Among the most remarkable changes is the increase of the median age, from 34.1 to 20.6 years in only two decades (Table 1) . At the same time, total per capita health spending in the purchasing power parity terms grew from $246 in 1995 to $1,312 in 2015 ( Table 1) . The latter changes are far more dynamic and dependent on the affordability issues and the overall welfare in the country. Nevertheless, there remains one important indicator of growing priority of health spending for the national policy makers. Share of gross domestic product available devoted to health care jumped from approximately seven to 10 percentage points. Unlike in some mature economies as in the case of Japan, Serbian official statistics have no insight into the part of medical consumption attributable to the elderly 1.56 (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) -0.36 Number of live births (thousands) 650.41 (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) 458.76 (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) -191.65 Number of deaths (thousands) 524.34 (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) 566.83 (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) +42.49 Ratio between the number of live births and deaths 1.24 (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) 0.81 (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) -0.43 Life expectancy at birth, male/female (years) 69/75 (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) 72/77.5 (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) +3.0 / + 2.5 Old-age dependency ratio (ratio of population 65+ per 100 population 15- (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) 74.65 (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) +2.74 Life expectancy at age 60 (both sexes combined) (years) 17.71 (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) 19.12 (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) +1.41 Health care expenditure indicators** Total health expenditure % gross domestic product 7% 10% [41] . This is by far the most comparable indicator of medical spending in international terms. Thus, it is clear that medical and long-term home care is gradually becoming an area of great national interest. Further on, as we might see from the published literature, similar patterns of population ageing are becoming familiar to all of the Southeast European nations inclusive of some of the traditionally younger ethnic communities [42] . The myriad of these diverse health care legacies are now forced to adapt to the new circumstances. Rapid and extensive development of legislative framework devoted to genders, retirement, and elderly health insurance issues in Serbia are good examples of what is happening in the entire region [43, 44] .
HEALTH EXPENDITURE IN THE COUNTRY OVER THE PAST TWENTY YEARS
Health spending patterns in Serbia since the early 1990s were marked by notable health reforms [45] . Impetus for such efforts came externally by supranational authorities such as the World Health Organisation, European Commission, World Bank, and UN agencies, and was adopted by a series of local governments [46] . Changes from socialist health care establishments of the former Yugoslavia towards the pre-World War II free market traditions began in the 1990s. We should bear in mind that most former Yugoslav republics, with the exception of Slovenia, entered this process with a one-decade delay due to civil wars of Yugoslavia [47] . Yugoslavia health care financing model was not a typical Semashko system, unlike in most of Central and Eastern European societies (CEE), but rather mixed Bismarck with a municipally-funded health care [48] . Regardless of many cycles of capacity building in health care and institutional changes, in most of CEE and Serbia alike, central state-owned health insurance funds survived to date. These funds remain the pillars of public health care funding in a setting with rather underdeveloped private health sector. Although governmental financial responsibilities increased during the past two decades in Serbia, these were effectively overwhelmed by the out-of-pocket spending [49] . The growth of private expenditure on health is probably the single most concerning fact in the Balkans and even the top emerging BRICS markets as well [50] . Such a trend depicts actually the inability of local authorities to increase investments in health to compensate the vulnerability of at least the poorest citizens against the catastrophic health spending. Impoverishment due to illness remains common throughout the Southeast European region. Parts of these medical care costs incurred to the patient's family are legal mandatory payments, while others represent informal payments and corruption of sorts. Regardless of the nature of excessive medical spending by the ordinary citizens, most is attributable to the leading non-communicable prosperity diseases. Cancer, diabetes, depression, fertility assistance, hepatitis, AIDS -these are some of the top morbidity causes with a huge budget impact and work load for the Serbian hospital and outpatient sector [51, 52 ].
An indirect indicator of the transforming cost matrix within the national health care system is actually the local pharmaceutical market. Although it doubled in size in terms of the value-based turnover of prescription medicines, some Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical code groups have gained momentum well over 2,000% in only a decade while others have virtually disappeared. A prominent budget impact belongs to expensive monoclonal antibodies and targeted biologicals used in oncology and autoimmune diseases [53] . This simple fact points out to the slowly-reshaping morbidity structure of the local population and a changed demand for certain pharmaceuticals [54] . The balance between brand name drugs and generic medicines plays a great role, which is most obvious in the case of large markets [55] . Here we may see that reimbursement rules for drugs prescribed by the attending physician were evolving towards a more strict control, cost containment, and greater participation by the patients in the costs of treatment. Unlike in the socialist era, the inability of the public funding to cover the needs for medicines outside essential ones led to the vulnerability of poor citizens and households [56, 57] . Many studies indicate that the level of poverty among the retired elderly citizens in Serbia is by far the highest compared to the national average [58] . These gaps and insufficiencies are frequently covered by their employed children and out of revenues other than pension.
CONCLUSION
Population ageing is a phenomenon so widespread and far-reaching that it will mark the spirit of the 21st century and all domains of life of diverse communities across the globe. Besides promising gains in longevity, it leads to substantial growth of medical care needs in all societies. Contemporary health systems have been historically built on the demographic growth model. Such systems will not be capable to cope with the sky-rocketing costs of medical and long-term care associated with the ever-larger share of the elderly. Serbia is no exception to these rules. Adopting national policies of support to the healthy ageing might release some of the financial pressure. Other strategies could involve personalized medical care and higher involvement of cost-effectiveness criteria in priority allocation of medical resources [59] . Without a bottom-up rethinking of national health coverage and social support traditions, burden of ageing itself will remain virtually unbearable even for the richest of nations [60] .
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